## APPEAL NO. 033069 FILED JANUARY 14, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 28, 2003. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease, and did not have disability. The claimant appealed essentially on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The respondent (carrier) responded, urging affirmance.

## **DECISION**

Affirmed.

The claimant contended at the CCH that she sustained a compensable injury as a result of the repetitive motions required for performing her assigned job tasks for the employer. The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease.

The claimant had the burden of proof on the injury issue and it presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The claimant's appeal, for the most part, takes issue with the way the hearing officer weighed the The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and evidence presented. materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). In this instance, the hearing officer was not persuaded that the claimant's current medical condition was caused by repetitive or cumulative trauma as claimed. The hearing officer was acting within his province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the hearing officer's injury determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The 1989 Act requires the existence of a compensable injury as a prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16). Because we have affirmed the hearing officer's determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, we likewise affirm the determination that she did not have disability.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **(a certified self-insured)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

## DW (ADDRESS) (CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).

CONCUR:	Margaret L. Turner Appeals Judge
Judy L. S. Barnes Appeals Judge	
Elaine M. Chaney Appeals Judge	